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A NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF HUNGARY'S
POST-SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION
ISTVÁN R. GÁBOR
As a result of the economic transformation that followed the
systemic change of the political order, the formerly prominent
role of internal labour markets of large enterprises has been
largely discontinued in Hungary and taken over by occupational
type labour markets. At the same time the Hungarian labour
market has become conspicuously closed and inflexible. Looking
for the causes of this paradoxical situation the author calls
attention to the fact that parallel to the dissolution of the earlier
internal labour markets a new institutional infrastructure fitting
the logic of operation of occupational type labour markets has as
yet failed to evolve.
The severe transformationary recession of the 1990s in Hungary was
eagerly accommodated in the labour market: employment declined in
excess of the fall of production, and real wages declined substantially as
well. With these socially painful adjustments over, Hungary's labour
market is, however, now seemingly reluctant to accommodate the much-
hoped-for economic upswing: even under the circumstances of positive
economic growth and rising investment, employment continued to decline
last year (in 1996); the relatively high rate of unemployment remains, and
without effectively mitigating wage inflationary pressure; in spite of the
fact that the majority of those squeezed out of employment have withdrawn
from the labour force – particularly those with little hope to be rehired later
–, long-term unemployment is not diminishing. This involves the danger2
that the ongoing economic recovery will fuel wage inflation in a degree
that calls for restrictive economic policies, with the consequence that the
recovery may get stuck before growing demand for labour could bring forth
any sizeable increase in employment. The overtly excluding character of
the Hungarian labour market, moreover, as a result of which huge masses
of people are compelled to make their living as self-employed, may act to
perpetuate the current unfortunate state of affairs in which overpopulated
and overfragmented small businesses are a medium of an acute danger of
long-term economic dualisation.
In our searching into the causes and cures of this unfortunate situation in
the rest of this paper, the legacy of the socialist era, most notably the
prominent role and systemic characteristics of internal labour markets of
large enterprises of the time, will be considered first. Next we will look at
how those particular internal labour markets have largely disintegrated and
dissolved into occupational labour markets in the 1990s without similarly
far-reaching complementary changes in the institutional infrastructure of
the labour market having been implemented, which produced a kind of
institutional imbalance. We will argue that it is this uneven process of
institutional development (combined, perhaps, with factors widely held
responsible for unemployment persistence in some long-established market
economies) that accounts for Hungary's disquieting labour market
experience in the current initial stage of economic recovery. The main
lesson we will draw from this assessment is that in the years to come a
prerequisite of lasting economic growth and small-business modernisation
in Hungary is the alignment of the institutional infrastructure of the labour
market with the logic of operation of occupational labour markets.
The legacy of socialism — the prominent role and
systemic characteristics of internal labour markets
Within the context of the indirect mechanism of central economic
management of the 1970s and 80s, with labour power having remained the
single typically privately-owned resource of production, labour markets
were the most "authentic" markets of the Hungarian economy in that they
were coordinated dominantly through market (i.e., non-bureaucratic)
mechanisms
1.
                                                
1 This straightforward proposition, to which I take the courage from the conception of
affinity of ownership forms and modes of coordination put forward in KORNAI [1983]3
As a matter of fact, under the conditions of the essentially transactive
relationship that existed between buyers and sellers of labour, wage
differentials and variations in working conditions played a prominent role
in the allocation of workers among firms and occupations, economic
branches and regions, etc., as well as in the motivation of workers' on-the-
job behaviour2. Direct government interventions into the allocation of
labour were as a rule campaign-like and/or of limited range of effect;
central wage regulation, a permanent component of economic regulation,
served as a device to artificially constrain the overall rate of growth of
workers' earnings in order to mitigate inflationary pressure rather than to
directly influence earnings differentials; centrally imposed criteria of job
classification and remuneration (the so-called wage tariffs) did not in fact
substantially diminish employer discretion in the formation of earnings
differentials; forced participation in the labour force was virtually absent.
At the same time, owing to the conditions of a bureaucratically
coordinated, resource-constrained economy under which it operated, the
Hungarian labour market differed markedly from labour markets in
contemporary market economies. Most importantly, its normal state of
equilibrium was characterised by an overall excess demand for labour – a
disequilibrium that persisted at a high rate of employment3 and in the
presence of a sizeable and expanding, characteristically small-scale private
economy, the so-called second economy, acting as a supplementary source
of living rather than an alternative to full-time employment in the large
firm sector.
                                                                                                                                              
(and confirmed in his [1993b] – cf. his comments upon Figure 15.1 in Chapter 5), will
be qualified in the following paragraphs in accord with the relevant arguments of
Chapters 11 and 16 of KORNAI [1980] and of Chapters 10 and 23 of his [1993b].
2 This interpretation of the role of earnings differentials in Hungary goes as far back as
MTA KTI [1971], a hotly debated study of the time written by a collective of reform-
minded young economists, which remonstrated against glorification of workers'
loyalty to their firms and denunciation of "migratory birds", and pointed out
reasonable motives and favourable aspects of the high rate of workers' inter-enterprise
mobility that had marked the first two years of the New Economic Mechanism. With
full respect to the authors' bold protestation against the imposition of artificial
constraints upon labour mobility and the stigmatisation of workers' voluntary quits, I
will focus attention below on those systemic constraints which came to be recognised
later as setting objective limits to the potential role of wage differentials in the
coordination of labour allocation and in the motivation of workers.
3 Excess demand for labour prevailed even under the conditions of stagnation in the late
1980s, although employment (but not the rate of employment) declined somewhat. For
an analysis of the development and fluctuations of labour demand see FAZEKAS  -
KÖLLÕ [1990].4
With forced participation virtually absent, the attainment of this high rate
of employment was conditional upon a correspondingly high rate of
voluntary participation. Beside social transfers and allowances that reduced
the time and money costs of market work and/or discriminated against the
non-employed, this high rate of voluntary participation was brought about
essentially by two spontaneous mechanisms, both bound to occur under the
conditions of full employment, namely: 1. a kind of state-dependence of
voluntary participation, augmented by 2. a positive feedback between the
rate of employment and the rate of voluntary participation4.
1. As regards the former mechanism, the essence is that expanding
employment (possibly through the mobilisation of previously non-
employed labour) tends to augment the "normal rate of participation" by
giving rise to the proportion of those who are "accustomed to employment"
and thus willing to be in the labour force.
2. As for the latter mechanism, its essence is that the further the rate of
employment and, with it, the earner/dependent ratio rise, the weaker the
"relative purchasing capacity" of wages becomes (defined as the ratio of
the average real wage to the per capita real consumption of the working
population), meaning that households can only catch up with rising living
standards by adjusting their participation decisions to earlier rises in the
earner/dependent ratio, i.e., by further expanding their economic activity.
That is, while, in the absence of open unemployment, labour supply
could not even temporarily be curtailed by withdrawals from the labour
force of discouraged workers, a specific, long-run version of the so-called
added worker effect was largely responsible for the fast attainment of a
high rate of participation. In contrast to its short-run version, this long-run
effect is produced not by job losses of some household members (typically
primary earners), which, to the extent that their job losses are feared to be
permanent, urge some previously non-employed (economically inactive)
members in those same households to seek employment, but by the
demonstration effect of the growth of consumption other households
achieve by increasing their rates of participation.
While the rapidly growing rate of employment, via its (by definition
negative) impact on the relative purchasing capacity of wages, prompted
Hungarian households to increase their labour supply accordingly, it also
weakened the motivating potential of the prevailing wage differentials, and
so did the growing role of the second economy as a supplementary source
                                                
4 In the following discussion of these spontaneous mechanisms I draw on KORNAI
[1980] and [1993b] (particularly on chapters referred to in Footnote 1).5
of household incomes. To wit, both can be regarded, from the viewpoint of
individual households, as processes leading to "more diversified portfolios"
of their labour investments, weakening thereby their sensitivity (the
subjection of their per capita consumption capacities) to fluctuations in the
earnings (returns to the labour investments) of any one of their members.
Furthermore, while this weakened sensitivity would call for a widening
of the wage scale as a way to counter the resulted loss in the motivating
force of the prevailing wage differentials, the weakened relative purchasing
capacity of wages, itself a consequence of the very same conditions (high
employment rate coupled with high proportion of parallel participation in
the second economy), in fact narrows the feasible range of those
differentials for the following reason. Given the average wage, and
assuming that minimum and/or reservation wages must be positively
related to the costs of living at the prevailing living standards (not a
particularly stringent assumption indeed), which in turn are higher, the
higher the earner/dependent ratio and/or the larger the amount of additional
labour incomes that households accrue, it follows that the higher that ratio
and/or the larger that amount, the closer minimum and/or reservation wages
must be to the average wage, meaning that the narrower will be the feasible
range of wage differentials: Q. E. D.
This syndrome of widening of the necessary and narrowing of the
feasible wage scales, with the weakened motivating force of wages it
entailed, however, was not only a consequence but, as a factor giving rise
to a particular kind of substitution effect in household behaviour, also a
derived cause of the rising employment rate and growing proportion of
second economy incomes, and thus a link in the positive feedback
mechanism between the employment rate and the rate of economic activity
previously described. To wit, the narrower the existing wage differentials
in various dimensions (job effort, qualification, position in the job
hierarchy, etc.), and the smaller the effect of a given percentage of variation
of one's wage on the per capita consumption capacity of one's household,
the less one is motivated to improve one's wage position (through improved
performance, increased job search efforts, additional investments to one's
human capital, etc.), and the more one is tempted to seek to find additional
sources of income instead, i.e., to increase the economic activity of one's
family and oneself (in the form of a higher earner/dependent ratio, multiple
job holding, more extensive exploitation of one's opportunities to earn
income in the second economy, etc.). All this led to the paradoxical result
of an apparently self-sparing and at the same time self-exploiting
population in Hungary, i.e., to a kind of aversion among them from jobs6
that are demanding coupled with overtly work-centred time allocation
patterns.
Under the conditions just described, firms responded to the harsh
competition for labour in the first economy and the extensive presence of
the second economy roughly in three ways5.
First, they could try to improve their competitive position in the labour
market by raising their wages above the market rates. This course of action
was indeed prevalent among those privileged few (mostly giants, relative to
the size of the market) who, thanks to their strategically strong bargaining
position vis à vis the proper authorities, managed to obtain relief from the
rules of central wage regulation. As a result of what was just said about the
limited motivating potential of wage differentials, however, even they
could hardly expect to attain concessions of such a scale that would enable
them to achieve permanent improvements of sufficient magnitudes. They
could rather expect their competitive position to improve by using their
informal bargaining position to make the proper authorities adjust the
occupational composition of regular training to their particular needs, and
by running apprentice workshops within that training6.
Second, in order to get hold of an enlarged pool of job applicants and
reduce replacement needs arising from voluntary quits, firms could also
experiment with concessions on performance and skill requirements. By
doing so, they could rightly expect to appear more attractive as places of
employment before those who were satisfied with their secondary earner
positions in their households or had a major interest in the second economy
as a source of income. Considerable concessions of this type, however,
were not affordable but for firms with production technologies and work
organisations largely immune to the inferior working morale and poor
technical skills of a more or less significant part of their labour force.
Finally, firms could try to enhance their labour market attractiveness,
motivating capacity and labour retaining power by establishing internal
labour markets, i.e., offering part of their workers "privileges" by seniority
and merits. Considering the predominance of large firms as employers most
apt for the establishment of internal labour markets, and the high frequency
of production disturbances and bottlenecks (due to short and uncertain
supplies of inputs, worn and outdated, often idiosyncratic and ill-matched
                                                
5The ways and means of adjustment of Hungarian firms to the conditions of labour
shortage are a main theme in FAZEKAS–KÖLLÕ ibid., where their findings of more than
a decade of labour market research are presented.
6For further details consult with FAZEKAS-KÖLLÕ ibid.7
machinery, etc.) that called for a good amount of firm specific knowledge
at all levels of the job hierarchy as a prerequisite of initiative and effective
daily improvisations, no wonder that internal labour markets as a form of
adjustment became preponderant in the Hungarian labour market.
In many respects they resemble their market economy counterparts
(entry-port jobs, long-term employment relationships with a strong bearing
of the length of tenure and on-the-job training on wages and promotion,
etc.7), whose existence is usually traced back partly to the productivity
enhancing effects of specific knowledge and skills acquired while working
with the firm, partly to the role a positive association between earnings and
tenure as a kind of deferred payment may play in discouraging shirking and
quits and attracting job applicants of superior quality, and partly to the role
long-term employment relation may play as a device for firms to learn
more about the productivity of their workforce and thus improve job
matching at reduced screening costs. Due to the above described systemic
characteristics of the context in which they operated, internal labour
markets of Hungarian firms were at the same time distinct in several
respects8.
First, the rules that governed the allocation and pricing of labour in these
internal markets were less transparent. Instead of collective negotiations
taking place before the eyes of the workforce and according to more ore
less well-defined procedural rules and principles of representation, they
were formed typically in behind-the-scene informal and selective,
occasional bargains. Job assignments and rules of promotion were similarly
less transparent and less unambiguous.
Second, the fortune of these internal labour markets was tightly
dependent on how far a given firm could influence those bureaucratic
decisions that formed the officially recognised catalogues of crafts and
occupations, the occupational composition and curricula of regular training
or the allocation of the right to run apprentice workshops.
                                                
7For the characteristics of internal labour markets in a market economy setting see
OSTERMAN (ed.) [1984].
8 Their rules of operation, with particular attention to formal and informal mechanisms
of wage determination, were brought to light in a large part in the late 1970s and early
1980s by shop-floor case studies carried out at large industrial and service firms by a
research group headed by Gábor Révész. (For their findings see the respective
chapters by Károly Fazekas and János Köllõ in  GALASI (ed.) [1982] and in the
working papers collected in FAZEKAS et al. [1983a].) Their findings were confirmed
and complemented by further empirical evidence and interpreted as indicating
systemic distinctiveness by STARK [1986].8
Finally, under the conditions of the predominance of task wage (as
against time wage) as a form of workers' remuneration, the positive
association between earnings and tenure, a distinctive feature of any
internal labour market, was in its Hungarian version based not so much on
one's regular job promotions and pay advancements as on informal
practices that provided preferential treatment on the shop floor for the
tenured in the daily allocation of tasks of differing wage/effort ratios, and –
perhaps even more importantly – on generous overtime assignments for
them. The primary role of informal overtime provisions in the operation of
the Hungarian version of internal labour markets (and in the evasion of
central wage regulation) as well as the less formalised and less bureaucratic
– more informal and market-like - rules of allocation of labour and pay in
these markets in general became particularly evident in the 1980s with the
emergence and fast proliferation of intra-enterprise work partnerships9.
A paradox of transformation — inflexible occupational labour markets
As is well known, the Hungarian economy was hit by a severe
transformationary recession in the 1990s10. Employment declined by over
25 per cent – in excess of the fall of production –, while real wages were
eroding and registered unemployment rose to a rate of over 10 per cent11.
Clearly, a fall of employment in excess of the decline of production (with a
corresponding improvement in productivity) would have been impossible
had not a good part of the formerly established internal labour markets
disintegrated and dissolved into occupational labour markets. To wit,
internal labour markets in recessionary periods act as employment buffers
in that they reduce the output elasticity of employment and, by so doing,
tend to lower (or slow down the growth of) productivity.
That internal labour markets did in fact recede and give ground to
occupational labour markets in Hungary in the 1990s should be placed
                                                
9  See, e.g., NEUMANN [1988] and STARK [1989].
10 The arguments that follow take the views and ideas advanced by KORNAI [1993a],
[1995] and [1996] on the causes of the transformationary recession and conditions of
recovery as a reference but are confined to aspects strictly related to the labour
market.
11  János Timár was among the first who took notice of the fact that compared to the
dramatic decline of employment that was brought about by the transformationary
recession (as a result of which Hungary's employment rate fell to a level even lower
than is typical among market economies) the magnitude of the increase of
unemployment was disproportionately small in absolute terms. (See TIMÁR [1994].)9
primarily on the account of privatisation which brought in its train the
predominance of firms too small and shaky to maintain internal labour
markets12. This is shown particularly blatantly in the almost explosion-like
spread of self-employment. Obviously, given the natural desire of the
overwhelming majority of workers for income and job security, such an
abrupt proliferation of self-employment could hardly have occurred had
employment opportunities in internal labour markets not diminished
drastically. Moreover, self-employment in Hungary today is in a large part
only a mask that hides extremely precarious employment relations
(representing the polar opposite of the kind of employment relationship
characteristic of internal labour markets) whereby separation costs as well
as taxes and social security contributions can be saved. The excessive
multiplication of this kind of compelled (pseudo-)self-employment should
be seen as not a manifestation of a working population highly
entrepreneurial in spirit but an indication of a temporary detour, or perhaps
even worse: a low-equilibrium trap, of small-business development13.
Another piece of indirect evidence of the disintegration of formerly
established internal labour markets and their dissolution into occupational
labour markets is the withdrawal of firms from regular training: the role
they would play in regular training by establishing and operating apprentice
workshops in their factories (as a device to get access to a larger and
selected pool of skilled young workers) is now increasingly assumed partly
by workshops run by the training schools themselves, partly by micro-
businesses who can thus benefit from tax relieves (and also from informal
fees that families of apprentice candidates without a place of practical
training might be forced to pay)14. Similar conclusion can be drawn,
                                                
12  SMITH [1988] finds that only firms large enough (with a staff of about 500 at least –
according to OI [1983] 1000) establish internal labour markets.
13 This is suggested by the apparent inconsistency of the relatively low rate of failure
and retreat of our overpopulated and overfragmented small-business sector: as many
as two-thirds of those small and mostly young undertakings which were surveyed in
1993 were still in business in 1966. (See LENGYEL (ed.) [1996].) Moreover, the death
rate of those from among them which had been started under the pressure of
necessity was below that of the total sample. And although the size of the units
(measured on their staff) that had survived increased somewhat during that three-year
period, this did not hold for the small-business sector as a whole (see figures in
Footnote 16). For my view of the current state of health of the Hungarian small-
business sector and its developmental prospects see GÁBOR [1997].
14 While the number of apprentices participating in regular vocational training dropped
by 17 percent between 1990–1991 and 1993–1994, those from among them who
attended training shops run by schools even increased by 58 percent while the
number of apprentices trained in groups at firms decreased by 49 percent. At the10
tentatively at least, from the statistical observation that, other things being
equal, those from among the unemployed who prior to unemployment were
relatively low paid in their jobs – and can thus be assumed to constitute a
sub-sample in which workers with shorter or no tenure in an internal labour
market are overrepresented –, if get reemployed, typically register a wage
gain while the formerly better-paid reemployed will typically suffer a
loss15. As for waged employment in micro-businesses, registered
employment is rare among them16 but where it exists, it does so mostly in
the form of casual/seasonal and part-time employment with practically no
guarantee of job and/or income security of any kind. Furthermore, small-
business owners prefer to rely on references obtainable from fellow-
entrepreneurs when searching for new employees17 – again a practice that
would clearly be foreign to an internal labour market context, where
employers had better rely on their workers' recommendations.
Of course I do not want to say that internal labour markets in Hungary
have been deprived entirely of their conditions of existence. (Just as it
would be a mistake to ignore, when talking about the predominance of
internal labour markets, the role occupational labour markets played in the
1970s through the 1980s as places of employment for those large segments
of workers who were only loosely attached to the labour force and/or eager
to accept less-remunerative-less-demanding jobs – or simply unskilled and
untrainable.) Managers of newly established Hungarian subsidiaries of
multinational companies, for instance, make their best to adopt Western-
type internal labour markets, as is demonstrated by their efforts to build up
their own systems of training as a private source of supply of skilled labour
for themselves. In other cases privatisation of existing firms, where it was
not followed by the introduction of new technologies, left their old-type,
informal internal labour markets almost unaltered in spite of management
                                                                                                                                              
same time participation in other (non-group) forms of regular training grew by 12
percent. (Source of figures: BENEDEK (ed.) [1994].)
15  This observation is reported (and given a hypothetical interpretation that – unlike
the one I am proposing – relies on the theory of statistical discrimination) in KÖLLÕ -
NAGY [1995].
16  According to figures reported in LAKY [1996], the average number of employees in
unincorporated small-undertakings of single owners – typically own-account workers
– did not change from 1993 to 1995: it remained as low as 0.3. As for corporations,
the ratio of those with a staff of less than 20 even increased, from 72.5 to 87 percent,
between 1991 and 1995. A particularly striking increase could be observed in the
ratio of the smallest corporations: the proportion of those with a staff of 10 or less
grew from 47.6 to 74.8 percent in the two-year period of 1993 to 1995.
17  See LAKI [1997].11
efforts18. What I do want to say though is that in Hungary today a much
smaller proportion of workers have a chance to be employed in internal
labour markets than what they were used to in the 1980s, and a much larger
proportion should rest satisfied with employment opportunities
occupational labour markets offer (for the most part including self-
employment).
Meanwhile, however, labour market in Hungary has become
conspicuously closed and inflexible. Notwithstanding the remarkable
gaining ground of occupational labour markets, it responds to economic
recovery in ways (not even) predominance of internal labour markets
would imply. As a matter of fact, even under the conditions of positive
economic growth and rising investment employment continued to decline
last year; the relatively high rate of unemployment remains; in spite of the
fact that the majority of those squeezed out of employment in recent years
have withdrawn from the labour force – particularly those with little hope
to be rehired later – and are now economically inactive (therefore not
counted as unemployed), long-term unemployment is not diminishing;
wage inflationary pressure has not lessened19.
This paradoxical behaviour of the Hungarian labour market – excessive
job-rationing20 and wage-inflationary pressure in the context of
occupational labour markets – is intellectually embarrassing indeed. More
importantly, it involves the danger that the ongoing economic recovery will
fuel wage inflation in a degree that calls for restrictive economic policies,
                                                
18 This was demonstrated by case studies – e.g., BÓDIS [1996], [1997] and JANKY
[1996] – of an ongoing research project (entitled "Economic sociological
investigation of hierarchical economic organisations") informed by the ideas of
CSONTOS [1994] and coordinated by him until his early death in 1997.
19 For a solid and carefully-documented general account of the labour market impacts
of the Hungarian economic transformation see GALASI - KERTESI (eds.) [1996].
20 The phenomenon of job rationing as a regime in which otherwise apt outside
applicants are widely denied jobs even despite their lower wage claims is traced back
by efficiency wage theories in part to workers' unobserved heterogeneity. This being
the case, and considering the fact that the existence of internal labour markets are
also traced back in part to this heterogeneity, it follows that efficiency wages and
internal labour markets are in this respect conditional upon each other. (Cf. WEISS
[1990].) Note also that the role internal labour markets may play in maintaining a
regime of excessive job rationing is tacitly acknowledged in the so-called insider-
outsider approach by LINDBECK-SNOWER [1988] as well, in which insider workers,
understood as "full-fledged employees", are claimed to be able and willing to make
underbidding by the outsiders expensive for the employers to accept and/or
disagreeable for the outsiders themselves to engage in.12
with the consequence that the recovery may get stuck before growing
demand for labour could bring forth any sizeable increase in
employment21. The overtly excluding character of the Hungarian labour
market, moreover, as a result of which huge masses of people devoid of
entrepreneurial spirit are notoriously deprived of the possibility of waged
employment and are compelled to make their living as self-employed, may
contribute to the perpetuance of the current unfortunate state of affairs in
which overpopulated and overfragmented small-businesses are a medium
of an acute danger of long-term economic dualisation and thus represent a
threat to rather than a catalyser of economic transformation. In order to
escape these dangers it is essential to explore what causes lie behind labour
market inflexibility.
Obviously, differences in historical precedents and peculiarities of the
transformationary recession preclude the possibility of extracting
immediately adaptable lessons and direct guidance from treatments of
labour market rigidities market economies experienced following the oil-
price explosions. At the same time, a special account of their findings, one
that considers them in the light of the peculiarities of the Hungarian case,
may serve as a useful starting point of exploration.
Note, first of all, that similar to the situation the majority of the
developed market economies faced following the oil price explosions,
Hungary in the 1990s got acquainted with high unemployment rates
coupled with high rates of inflation. This syndrome, commonly known as
stagflation, was originally assumed to arise in part from anomalies of
adjustment ("friction") accompanying accelerated structural changes. The
larger the structural (regional, occupational, etc.) disequilibria of the labour
market at a given point of time – the argument goes –, the higher the rate of
unemployment necessary to discipline inflationary pressure22.
                                                
21  In his discussion of the role the development of wages and consumption played in
the transformationary recession, and of the kind of income policy to be pursued in
the recovery, Kornai repeatedly calls attention to this danger – see KORNAI [1993a],
[1995] and [1996]. (For a markedly different position on the same issues see
MATOLCSY [1997].)
22  I.e., the higher the natural rate of unemployment in a competitive economy; and the
higher the equilibrium rate of unemployment (NIRU or NAIRU) in imperfect
competition – understood as the rate at which workers' real wage claims and firms'
real profit claims are consistent with each other and, as a result, price-inflation
expectations are fulfilled. (Note that the theory of imperfect competition is itself a
product of the 1980s – see BLANCHARD [1986] and BLANCHARD - SUMMERS [1988].)
Since the arguments below refer to the conditions of imperfect competition, the
concept of equilibrium unemployment is adopted hereafter.13
An important implication of this approach is though that with accelerated
structural changes having been accomplished stagflation is bound to
disappear – an implication that was not entirely supported by later
experience. True, equilibrium unemployment declined in the 1980s but not
as far as its pre-stagflation level and with considerable variation among
individual countries. This directed analysts' attention to the effects
institutional factors like 1. labour market corporativity, 2. path-dependency
of equilibrium unemployment (usually labelled as hysteresis) or 3. internal
versus occupational labour markets may exert upon a country's
unemployment performance. It is these factors whose responsibility for the
inflexibility of the Hungarian labour market we now consider23.
1. Initial attempts to find out why the unfavourable effects of the oil-
price explosions lasted longer than had been anticipated, and why they
varied in degree from country to country, yielded the assertion that there
exists a theoretically well-arguable U-shape relationship between labour
market corporativity (centralisation of wage negotiations) and
unemployment performance24.
Centralised (macro-level) collective bargaining is claimed to have the
most desirable properties on the ground that unions negotiating in such
setting are in a position that both allows and enables them to take full
account of the unfortunate effect excessive wage claims (ones that are
inconsistent with the anticipated growth of productivity) may exert on the
rate of price inflation. They will thus not easily fall victim of wage illusion
on one hand. On the other hand, they are aware of the danger an
unanticipated acceleration of price inflation entails, namely, that it
normally invokes restrictive economic policies as counter-actions, which in
turn result in declining employment, imposing involuntary unemployment
upon a part of their membership and increasing burdens of unemployment
benefit contributions upon the rest.
Micro-level collective negotiations are claimed to have favourable
properties as well, which would explain the relatively good unemployment
record of those countries where unions are engaged typically in firm-level
bargaining. Here trade unions will feel obliged to show self-restraint for
they know that at a firm facing highly price-elastic demand for its products
workers face highly wage-elastic employment opportunities. Consequently,
unions will fear that higher wages (whether or not increasing production
                                                
23  References to the literature on which the relevance of these factors for Hungary is
considered are placed in footnotes at the respective sections.
24  See CALMFORS - DRIFFIL [1988].14
costs will be passed on to buyers in the form of higher prices) may lower
the firm's profits (either because of falling revenues or as a consequence of
lower profit margins) and induce staff decrease.
Industry-level bargaining, by contrast, is clearly the worst alternative
setting as far as equilibrium unemployment implications are concerned, for
industry unions negotiating separately will act like non-cooperating players
in a prisoners' dilemma game. That is, they will know that none of them
bears full responsibility for the impact excessive union wage claims in the
aggregate make on the rate of unemployment and inflation, and since each
of them will know that everybody else will think this way and act
accordingly, they all are likely to end up with showing minimum restraint.
Also, with demand for an industry's output being less price elastic than that
of a firm (in consequence of the lower substitutability of an industry's
output), industry unions have less reason to bother about the industry-level
employment impact of their wage claims.
Now, in Hungary today, taking the as yet rudimentary state of industrial
relations into consideration25, one should be sceptical about the merits of
an explanation of labour market inflexibility that would draw too heavily
on the above arguments. Be the differential equilibrium unemployment
impacts of different degrees of corporativity as claimed, the most one can
extract as lessons relevant to the Hungarian case are "ifs". One can only say
that had macro-level tripartite negotiations turned out to be more
productive, and/or had the implementation of some kind of Western-type
income policy (that would have filled the gap the hasty elimination of
central wage regulation in 1990 had left behind) been tried and found
effective as a device to moderate wage inflation, etc., then Hungary might
have tided over the economic transformation at lower costs, i.e., with less
restrictive economic policies and thus less job losses26. Similarly,
equilibrium unemployment in the years ahead could in principle be
favourably affected by a macro-level collective agreement in which the
parties would commit themselves to moderate wage inflation. Realistically,
however, it is exactly the present rudimentary state of industrial relations
that makes it hard to believe in the feasibility of such an agreement.
Hungary's strongly divided trade unions keenly competing for a shrinking
constituency base can hardly be expected to enter into such an agreement.
                                                
25 For facts substantiating this unfavourable general assessment see LADÓ - TÓTH (ed.)
[1996].
26 In his assessment of the results of the much talked-of corrective measures of Bokros-
package KORNAI [1996] himself sees it as a fortunate accident, presumably the
consequence of a surprise inflation, that real wages declined considerably in 1995.15
Do they still become resigned to doing it, it would be naïve to assume that
they will indeed be up to consistently meet the negotiated terms.
2. Similar doubts can be cast on the merits of the oldest (but still quite
recent) versions of path dependency arguments27 as far as their relevance
to Hungary is concerned. True, they start out from the assumption that
trade unions act as partial representatives of insider workers' interests – a
kind of partiality which is clearly manifest in union behaviour in Hungary
as well. This partiality, however, could produce hysteresis only in so far as
our unions were massively involved in wage setting.
As against these early explanations, later interpretations of this same
phenomenon are based on assumptions that do seem directly applicable to
the Hungarian case. Namely, they assume that either employers are (for
good reason or not) reluctant to hire from among the long-term
unemployed or (if only for this reason) the long-term unemployed lack the
confidence necessary to effectively compete for jobs, or both. They argue
that since increasing unemployment tends to increase the incidence of long-
term unemployment – the proportion of long-term unemployed in total
unemployment –, it causes an upward shift in equilibrium unemployment,
i.e., an increase in wage inflation at any given level of total
unemployment28.
True, these latter interpretations, too, examine wage setting in a
collective bargaining context. Nevertheless they may serve as a suitable
reference in finding out the causes of labour market rigidity in Hungary for,
in the first place, they allow, implicitly at least, for the possibility that,
thanks to the high proportion of long-term unemployed in total
unemployment, large segments of insider workers remain defended against
the unfavourable impacts of massive unemployment – even in the lack of
strong union support. Moreover, their reasoning would even account for the
kind of low-employment-equilibrium trap situation where the disciplinary
(wage-inflation moderating) effect of an initial increase in total
                                                
27 See BLANCHARD - SUMMERS [1986], [1991].
28 See LAYARD - NICKELL [1986]. Although this line of reasoning appears to differ
funda-mentally from the previous one in its departure, as LEVER [1995] pinpoints:
depending on how broadly or restrictively the notion of 'outsiders' are defined –
whether it is meant to refer to the long-term (how long?) unemployed only or, more
broadly, to the unemployed, or it should embrace non-union member employees
and/or workers in non-internal labour market jobs as well – can one regard the two
lines of reasoning as theoretically more or less distinct from each other and attempt
to decide (possibly with the help of econometric analysis) which of the two fits
reality better.16
unemployment has been more than offset by the sufficiently large increase
of long-term unemployment it called forth. Yet, what would be essential in
the adoption of these interpretations to the Hungarian case is to address the
issue of what (presumably institutional) factors determine whether a given
(increase in the) rate of unemployment will be associated with larger or
smaller (growth of the) incidence of long-term unemployment.
Finally, according to a third characteristic explanation the observed
dependency of current rates of equilibrium unemployment on past rates of
unemployment has to do primarily with capacity utilisation fluctuating in
the course of a business cycle29. Namely, with capacity utilisation having
declined in the initial phase of a recession, a fall of investments and an
increase in capital scrapping are bound to follow – with the result that
capital stock will shrink. Granting this, when recovery comes it soon leads
to an overutilisation of the undersized capital stock, with the consequence
that price and wage inflation will start to accelerate at a relatively low rate
of employment (and a correspondingly high unemployment rate).
Now, in view of the enormous magnitude of the reduction of capital
stock that accompanied the tranformationary recession in Hungary, this
argument deserves serious consideration. At the same time, it should be
kept in mind that hysteresis of such origin, unless the rise of inflation thus
induced is misdiagnosed and suppressed by hastily adopted restrictive
economic policy measures, is transitory by nature, and that timely
anticipation of an imminent and fast recovery may give impetus to business
investments early enough to simultaneously accelerate the upswing and
prevent an undue transitory rise of inflation.
3. While traces of the ideas reviewed and reflected upon in the foregoing
appear incidentally in the study of the ongoing transformation of the
Hungarian labour market, the marked and sudden contraction of the domain
of internal labour markets and its bearing on the prospects of economic
transformation have somehow remained beyond our range, leaving obvious
parallels with market economy experience unrecognised and unexploited.
The section that follows is meant to amend this negligence.
                                                
29  See SOSKICE–CARLIN [1989].17
Labour market in institutional imbalance —
a clue to the riddle of inflexible occupational labour markets
Cross-country comparative labour market studies usually reveal marked
correspondence between the historically established patterns of coexistence
of internal versus occupational labour markets and certain aspects of the
institutional infrastructure that surrounds the labour market (vocational
training, statues of labour, industrial relations, employer and employee
attitudes and norms of behaviour, etc.)30.
The instrumentality of this correspondence becomes obvious in the light
of the costs parties to an employment contract – workers and firms – incur
if they terminate their contract: the lower these transaction
(separation/replacement) costs, the more viable occupational labour
markets are31. These separation/replacement costs are in turn lower, the
closer substitute job offers of different employers are for a worker with a
given qualification, and the closer substitute workers with a given
qualification are for a firm, i. e., the more standardised the skill-
requirements of a given occupation and the actually acquired skills of
workers with a given qualification are. Now, the more standardised
occupational skills and skill-requirements are, the more reasonable it is that
occupational skills be acquired in specialised training institutions obliged to
respect the established occupational standards in their subject-matters of
instruction, rather than in the form of on-the-job training. Furthermore,
under the conditions of low separation/replacement costs that highly
standardised occupational skills acquired in specialised training institutions
                                                
30  See especially EYRAUD et al. [1990]. Also see HASHIMOTO–RAISIAN [1988].
31  These costs include the so-called quasi-fix costs of employment born by employers
(costs of recruitment and selection, direct and indirect costs of training of newly
hired workers, severance payments, etc.) as well as those direct and indirect costs
that workers incur in case of a change in their place of employment (search costs,
reduction in one's expected life-time earnings, etc.), which might be substantial in
internal labour markets and negligible in occupational markets. (Cf. OI [1983].)
     Note that equilibrium unemployment is also seen as a function of institutional factors
– namely, of the existence of severance payment, a characteristic of internal labour
markets – in the multiple-equilibrium model set up by SAINT-PAUL [1995] in the
spirit of BLANCHARD–SUMMERS [1988]. In that model severance payment has an
unfavourable impact on equilibrium unemployment partly by discouraging
separations, partly by strengthening the bargaining position of (insider) workers. This
gives rise to the conjecture that there is an overlapping between the first two of those
explanations of high equilibrium unemployment that were discussed in the above
under the heading of hysteresis unemployment and ones that concentrate on the
effects of institutional factors related to the type of the labour market.18
entail, workers can best promote their interests collectively by forming or
joining unions that are organised along the lines of crafts and occupations,
and by pressing for collective agreements that include well-defined job
demarcation lines and formal qualification criteria of admittance that are
uniform throughout the economy.
With an internal labour market, by contrast, a two-pillar system of
vocational training is compatible whereby basic occupational skills
acquired at school are complemented by a large amount of special skills,
varying in contents from firm to firm, that can only be acquired while
working. In view of the long duration of employment contracts and the
strong bearing of the length of tenure and on-the-job training on earnings
and promotion, workers can best advance their interests collectively by
forming or joining unions that are organised at the level of the firm (or
group of firms within the same branch of the economy), and by pressing for
collective agreements that include well-defined and enforceable rules of
hiring, firing, and promotion (possibly together with other kinds of job
property rights provisions).
Whether the configuration of the labour market and its institutional
infrastructure in a given country at a given time is more of internal or
occupational type is the result of a historic process of institutional
evolution. In the course of that process tensions arising from the perception
of unexploited opportunities and/or unfulfilled expectations by workers and
firms (their dissatisfaction with each other's attitudes and behaviour, with
the performance of training institutions, with the prevailing system of
collective bargaining, and so on) would call forth institutional adjustments
that gradually eliminate inappropriate institutional elements. Presumably it
is mainly these gradual adjustments that eventually produce a constellation
which is largely self-perpetuating (with compatible and mutually
reinforcing opportunities and expectations) even amidst extreme swings in
economic environment.
The particular equilibrium that such a stable, self-perpetuating
institutional configuration represents should be respected by labour market
policies as well (themselves coming within the institutional infrastructure
of the labour market): it constrains the choice of the effectively adaptable
set of policy instruments. Faced with a predominantly internal labour
market configuration, for instance, active labour market policies should
take into account that participation in retraining programs cannot procure
tenured jobs for the prime-age unemployed, and to the extent this is known
to them, they may be reluctant to undergo retraining. In a configuration
where the typically occupational labour markets of small firms dominate,19
on the other hand, granting wage subsidies to employers hiring from the
unemployment pool will not be cost efficient either: non-renewed, short-
term employment relations and high turnover rates will result.
As for the present situation of the Hungarian labour market, it is far from
any kind of a self-reproducing institutional equilibrium. As a matter of fact,
the remarkable gaining ground of occupational labour markets has not been
accommodated by the institutional environment. Namely, parallel with the
liquidation of an increasing part of firms' apprentice workshops, the kinds
of skills and qualifications acquirable in vocational training have become
ever less transparent and standardised – lack of coordination and
supervision has led to an enormous inflation of certificates of dubious
credence and market value32. Moreover, falling investments consequential
upon the recession, by hindering the process of large-scale replacement of
obsolete capacities, retarded the devaluation of job-specific skills and thus
the diminution of separation costs. Trade union organisation along the lines
of crafts and occupations has not gathered momentum either. Or, while the
expectations of the main army of the unemployed bear the imprints of their
earlier internal labour market experience, too many of the newly trained
face as job applicants the disheartening experience of distrust towards their
qualification certificates on the part of employers33, etc.
Taking established market economies as a reference, the gaining ground
of occupational labour markets in Hungary in the course of transformation
should thus be assessed as an irregular, uneven process. In the period of
transformationary recession the role of internal labour markets as
employment buffers has been reduced (perhaps, even beyond what one
would regard as normal in a market economy) without the conditions of
operation of occupational labour markets (i.e., low separation/replacement
costs, that could have effectively moderated wage-inflationary pressure by
intensifying competition between insider and outsider workers, etc.) and
                                                
32 To refer back to regular vocational training, what lies behind the category of
"training not in groups" as a form of training currently in expansion is in a large part
training in technologically obsolete and/or narrowly specialised shops in the small-
business sector, which are for this reason alone inopportune to train apprentices the
niceties of an occupation.
33 That those who enter the labour market after completing their studies in regular
vocational training have nevertheless relatively good chances to get a job can partly
be explained by their willingness to accept jobs that were and/or could be filled with
unskilled workers. (This explanation is suggested in Chapter 5.3 of ILO [1997].) It is
indeed reasonable to assume that to the extent school and/or qualification certificates
are unsound signals of one's acquired general knowledge and/or occupational skills
employers are induced to hire formally overeducated and/or overskilled workers.20
thus a later expansion of employment having been created. Such being the
case, active labour market policies (like massive retraining programs or
generous wage subsidies) could as a matter of course not be particularly
effective either34.
To conclude this section, the main lesson to be drawn from the above
assessment of the Hungarian situation is that to the extent occupational
labour markets retain their prominence in the years to come, a prerequisite
of the degree of labour market flexibility and policy efficiency necessary
for sustainable economic growth is the formation of an appropriate
institutional infrastructure, i.e., one that fits and confirms the logic of
operation of occupational labour markets. This could, perhaps, best be
promoted here and now by redesigning the system of vocational training in
a way that could yield transparency. The work should possibly start with
the specification of the skill-requirements of occupations and then continue
with the elaboration of their standard cores of instruction – in themselves a
huge task, which could hardly be carried out successfully without
government assistance or involvement of organisations representing
workers' and employer's collective interests. The point is that only to the
extent the credibility of officially recognised qualification certificates
issuable by training institutions is reestablished can the expectations of
workers and employers gradually adjust to the principles of operation of
occupational labour markets and get reinforced by fulfilment.
Rights and wrongs of alternative institutional arrangements —
summary, qualifications and conclusions
In our searching into the causes of the apparent closedness and inflexibility
of Hungary's post-socialist labour market, the dimension of internal vs.
occupational labour market was highlighted. The essence of the diagnosis
thus established is that the rapid disintegration of the particular internal
labour markets of the 1980s and their dissolution into occupational labour
markets in the 1990s have not been matched by a corresponding
transformation of their institutional infrastructure, which produced a kind
                                                
34 Based on a wide range of unemployment literature, FALUS [1991] called attention to
the important role active labour market policies would have to play already in the
initial stage of economic transformation, and attempted to specify the main "strike
directions" that she believed could be appropriate under the constraints of
transformation. Yet, her expectations, although moderate compared to the views
prevailing that time, turned out to be too ambitious in the light of later experience.21
of institutional imbalance. It is fundamentally this institutional imbalance
that I blamed for why, after occupational labour markets having become
predominant (without which the dramatic decline in waged employment
that was experienced in the 1990s could not indeed have taken place),
today's Hungarian labour market responds to the initial stage of economic
recovery in ways – i.e., with wage and employment tendencies –
characteristic of internal labour markets, endangering thereby lasting
economic growth and small-business modernisation.
I noted that predominance of internal or occupational labour markets
does not mean their exclusiveness. I conceive it in a way similar to how
Kornai thinks of the predominance of state vs. private ownership as the
basis of bureaucratic vs. market coordination35. The same way as it is not
possible to specify exactly what proportion of state ownership is just large
enough to exclude the predominance of market coordination – obviously,
this critical proportion will depend on, inter alia, how far state ownership is
penetrated into different kinds of economic activities –, it cannot be
determined specifically in what proportion jobs should be of this or that
type so as to entitle one to speak of the predominance of a given labour
market type36. The most one can say is that in a proportion large enough to
bind the infrastructural institutions to conform to the logic of operation of
that particular labour market type, and that in this respect it is primarily
                                                
35 See e.g. KORNAI [1983].
36 The parallel may apply also to the market-like vs. bureaucratic nature of employment
contracts in that employment relations in an internal labour market – although any
employment relationship is inherently a dominantly market-type, transactive
relationship, in which employees as owners of their labour undertake certain tasks for
certain remuneration – are more bureaucratic in nature: employers retain more
discretion in managing the labour power of their employees (in exchange for
providing them guarantees for job security and promotion) than is the case in an
occupational labour market. (For a transaction-costs interpretation of the bureaucratic
aspects of internal labour market-type employment relations see the seminal paper by
WILLIAMSON et al. [1975]; other interpretations view employment relationship as a
particular kind of principal-agent relationship and stress the problem of moral
hazard; again others, following the footsteps of HIRSCHMAN [1995], point out the
importance of 'voice' as a political-institutional mechanism of adjustment
characteristic of internal labour markets, as against 'exit' as a competitive mechanism
characteristic of occupational labour markets – see e.g.  FREEMAN [1980].)
Occupational (internal) labour markets may thus be seen as representing a
configuration of ownership form and mode of coordination closer to (farther away
from) the pole of pure private ownership and pure market coordination.22
skilled manual (non-managerial) jobs in the market sector of the economy
whose distribution by labour market types matters37.
Before granting that infrastructural institutions (vocational training,
collective bargaining, statues of labour, expectations of employers and
workers, active labour market policies, etc.) should therefore conform to
the logic of operation of the predominant labour market type, one must
pose the question of whether this would not incapacitate the other type and
thus result in a degree of institutional homogeneity that, while promoting
short-term efficiency, endangers long term adaptability38.
The answer to this question should differentiate according to how
unambiguously workers of different crafts and occupations are separated
from each other with respect to the types of labour markets their jobs
represent, i.e., how segmented labour markets are in this respect39.
1. Among crafts and occupations where this kind of segmentation is
sharp – jobs belonging to them are associated unambiguously with this or
that labour market type – the principles of operation of their respective
labour market types can be expressed directly in the heterogeneity of the
institutional infrastructure.
2. Yet, such a high degree of segmentation by occupation is an exception
rather than a rule – at least among crafts and occupations we are primarily
interested in. Part of those completing regular training and entering the
labour force with a given qualification get employed, temporarily or
lastingly, in the occupational labour market, others in internal labour
markets. Would not an institutional infrastructure adjusted to the logic of
the dominant type of labour market of a given occupation lead in that
occupation to the incapacitation of the other labour market type and thus
eliminate institutional heterogeneity?
True, mutually reinforcing interactions taking place between the
dominant type of a labour market and an institutional infrastructure that
conforms to it are such that they have an unfavourable impact on the costs
                                                
37 It is by and large this range of jobs to which the comparison of the role internal vs.
occu-pational labour markets play in Britain and France is confined in EYRAUD et al.
ibid.
38 Based on a wide selection of the relevant literature,  GRABHER  - S TARK [1997]
convincingly demonstrate the importance of organisational diversity in the
evolutionary potential of economic institutions in general and under the conditions of
post-socialist transformation in particular.
39 For a review of the recent literature on labour market segmentation see MCNABB -
RYAN [1989].23
of operation of the non-dominant type (e.g., they impose excess costs of
training, search, collective bargaining, etc. on those who would rely on it),
inhibiting it from ever taking over predominance. Nevertheless it can
subsist in its non-dominant position and thus contribute to the perpetuance
of institutional heterogeneity in so far as its comparative advantages are
large enough to compensate for these excess costs. (For instance, a firm can
benefit from an internal labour market even in an occupational type
institutional environment inasmuch certain individual characteristics of
workers are of vital importance but can only be learned after long years of
service, or as long as a low turnover rate is worth these excess costs for
some other reasons.)
Although it might be redundant, I shall conclude my paper by noting that
the concept of labour market type was used all along in the foregoing as a
descriptive category devoid of any normative connotation. The reason I feel
that such an ending is appropriate is twofold, namely: 1. I am afraid that the
literature of labour market segmentation (or its loose reading) may make
someone associate the concept of internal labour market with the positive
notion of a submissive version of capitalism, or of the upper segment of the
labour market, and the concept of occupational labour market with the
negative notion of rough (wild) capitalism, or of the lower segment of the
labour market, and see on this ground the preponderance of internal labour
markets as a desirable goal in its own right40. 2. My insistence on the
formation of an institutional infrastructure adjusted to the logic of
occupational labour market as a way to the flexibilisation of the Hungarian
labour market may seem to be motivated by an opposite commitment: a
predilection for unbridled competition of laissez-faire capitalism.
1. From the observation that poorly paid arduous jobs devoid of
promotion prospects are located, as is emphatically stressed in the literature
of labour market segmentation, primarily outside internal labour markets, it
does not follow that it is the logic of operation of occupational labour
markets per se that accounts for the accumulation of these unfavourable job
characteristics. Suffice it to say that holders of some prestigious degrees of
high market value view exactly occupational labour markets as the most
suitable institutional setting for them to make a career. Realistically, both
                                                
40 Ironically though, it is exactly internal labour markets where BARTLETT [1989]
thinks employers have excessive negative (i.e., punitive) event power over their
employees. (See his vehement refutation in Chapter 7 of the idea of regarding
employment relation as a series of bilateral spot contracts with neither of the parties
having any real authority over the other – an idea that was put forward in ALCHIAN–
DEMSETZ [1972].)24
types of labour markets have, as was pointed out incidentally in the
preceding, right and wrong sides of distinctively their own.
A comparative advantage of occupational labour markets as against
internal labour markets is that owing to the more flexible adjustment of
employment to production fluctuations, economic recessions are less likely
to involve falling productivity and deteriorating international competitivity.
Furthermore, job losses are less likely to result in long-lasting
unemployment, and if only for this reason an early acceleration of wage
inflation is less of a danger in a later recovery. At the same time
occupational labour markets have the comparative disadvantage of an
inferior working morale, and a stronger resistance to technological
innovations that entail large-scale modifications in the skill requirements of
an occupation. These are less of a problem in an internal labour market,
given the possibilities of workers' internal promotions, reallocations and
retraining. Or, owing to low separation costs, workers employed in an
occupational labour market can quit with ease if they are made a better job
offer but can be laid off with ease as well. In an internal labour market, by
contrast, workers enjoy higher job security and more calculable career
prospects but at the price of facing substantial losses if it comes to
dismissal.
More important than going further with the enumeration of the right and
wrong sides of the respective types of labour market is from the viewpoint
of our topic to emphasise that, on one hand, their comparative advantages
can only unfold in an institutional environment that fits their particular
logic of operation; otherwise their advantages remain latent and only their
disadvantages become apparent. On the other hand, no such thing can exist
like a labour market that would be characterised by the comparative
advantages of either of the two types untinged with their disadvantages,
i.e., one that would combine the respective advantages of both. To be sure I
do not mean to say that their unfortunate effects cannot be restricted.
Active labour market policies should serve for exactly this purpose – but
again as themselves coming within the institutional infrastructure of the
labour market they should comply with the requirements of institutional
coherence in order to be effective.
2. Granting that neither of the two types of labour market is superior to
the other in terms of their social and/or economic impacts, why do I favour
the emergence of an institutional infrastructure that would conform to the
logic of occupational labour markets? After all I could start out from the
assumption that, facing an institutional infrastructure seemingly
inconsistent with the logic of operation of occupational labour markets,25
employers will increasingly resort to building up their own internal labour
markets, with the result that the present anomalies of the disrupted
institutional balance of the Hungarian labour market will gradually be
eliminated spontaneously.
Sure my position is dictated by neither a concealed taste for occupational
labour markets, nor even my rejection of the above assumption as for the
time being unrealistic. Instead, it is based on a confrontation of the above
described comparative advantages and disadvantages of the respective
types of labour market, and the lessons that were drawn in the equilibrium
unemployment literature after the oil price shocks, with my diagnosis of the
overtly excluding character and inflexibility of the Hungarian labour
market. This confrontation suggests to me – and this is what I tried to
demonstrate throughout my paper – that considering the urgency of a
marked reduction of wage inflation as a condition of any sizeable
expansion of waged employment (this latter being in turn, as was pointed
out, a necessary condition of small-businesses embarking on the road to
modernisation), it is the predominance of occupational labour markets that
promises a smoother way to economic development here and now.26
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